DOMINANT-STATE THINKING AND STATE-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES by Chen, Chunyuan
Review of Global Management and Service Science, Vol. 5, 2015 
 
8 
DOMINANT-STATE THINKING AND STATE-DEPENDENT 
PREFERENCES 
 
Chunyuan Chen 
Department of Business Administration 
 National Changhua University of Education 
No 2, Shi-Da Road, Changhua, Taiwan, ROC 
E-mail: cychen@cc.ncue.edu.tw 
 
 
ABSTARCT 
 
In this study, dominant-state thinking was represented in the form of a dominant state or a dominant event 
as an individual may perceive, and issues related to state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking 
were addressed accordingly. With a dominant state or a dominant event existing in the partial information 
possessed by an individual, the axiom of continuity, indispensable to the establishment of the expected-utility 
maximization theorem, may not hold in the presence of discontinuity in the individual's state-dependent 
preferences with dominant-state thinking. As presented in the study, the representations of the dominated states 
and the states contained in the dominated events as null states may tackle not merely the problem of 
discontinuity in an individual's state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking, but also the necessity 
of extremely high utility levels associated with a dominant state or a state contained in a dominant event. 
However, to present more appropriate representations of state-dependent preferences with dominant-state 
thinking within various contexts, research attention may be directed as well to issues related to the posterior 
state-dependent preferences of an individual and his further choice in the culmination of a dominated event, 
given his choice made under his prior state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking.  
Keywords: thinking; preferences; dominant state, dominant event, dominated state 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
With regard to individual choice under uncertainty, “the decision-maker faces some uncertainty about her 
preferences over the available alternatives. In many cases, she may be able to improve her decision by first 
engaging in some form of introspection or contemplation about her preferences” (Ergin and Sarver, 2010, p. 
1285). One of the issues related to the state-dependent thinking and choice which might be formed by an 
individual may be illuminated by the following correspondence between Aumann and Savage:  
IN A LETTER TO SAVAGE dated January, 1971, Aumann raises a conceptual difficulty with the notion 
of subjective probabilities as defined in Savage's Foundations of Statistics (1954). In his letter, Aumann 
describes a man who loves his wife very much, and whose life without her would be less attractive, less 
"worth living." The wife is sick and must undergo a routine but dangerous operation that only half of all 
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patients survive. The husband is offered a choice between betting a hundred dollars on the survival of his 
wife and betting the same amount on heads in a coin toss. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the man 
will prefer the former bet, since by betting on a coin toss he might win a hundred dollars under 
circumstances in which it would be worthless, namely, in the event that his wife dies. According to 
Aumann, this example describes a situation in which the notion of a consequence whose "value" is state 
independent does not exist. The preferences over outcomes are inherently state dependent so that the 
notions of utility and subjective probabilities may not be disentangled in a manner that would permit a 
meaningful definition of unique subjective probabilities.  
In his response, Savage recognizes the difficulty and then proceeds to outline a way of fitting the 
problem into his framework. …. (Karni, 1993, p. 187) 
As further mentioned by Karni (1993), the difficulty indicated in the correspondence between Aumann and 
Savage, is not specific merely to Savage's theory, but is also a crucial aspect of the Anscombe-Aumann 
definition of subjective probabilities under the assumption of state-independent preferences and embedded in 
subsequent versions of subjective expected utility theory. Karni asserted that there are circumstances which are 
more ordinary than the one described by Aumann and would be associated with the state of nature, on which the 
dependence of the preferences would be an indispensable ingredient of the decision problem an individual needs 
to solve. While it is questioned, as mentioned by (Myerson, 1991), whether any simple quantitative model may 
provide a sufficient and reasonable description of people’s behavior, beginning with the pioneering works of 
Ramsey, von Neumann and Morgenstern, and Savage, a vast number of research attempts have been made on 
axiomatic derivations of the subjective probability and expected-utility maximization to represent the behavior of 
an individual under uncertainty.  
 
2. STATE-PRIZE CORRESPONDENCE THINKING 
 
Whereas it would be difficult to precisely represent an individual's state-dependent preferences and choice, 
researchers attempted to address the issue with the aid of some basic generally accepted beliefs regarding a 
rational individual’s preferences over the correspondence between states and prizes. In their famous article, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) described a prospect ),;...;,( 11 nn pxpx  as a contract which specifies the 
correspondence between an outcome ix  
and the corresponding probability
ip , where 1
i
ip  for all 
outcomes, and referred to decision making under risk as a choice between prospects.  Following the 
conventional framework used for analyzing individual preferences and choice, and beginning with a finite, 
nonempty, set   containing elements called states, a  field X  on a nonempty set X  including 
elements referred to as prizes, Karni (1993) identified a consequence as a probability measure on the measurable 
space ),( XX   
and a roulette lottery as a consequence with finite support.  
A roulette lottery may be viewed as first-order thinking in the form of a correspondence between prizes 
and states and is characterized by prizes and the probabilities associated with the states on which the prizes 
are determined. With regard to the two bets of a man betting a hundred dollars on the survival of his wife and 
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betting the same amount on heads in a coin toss as mentioned in the correspondence between Aumann and 
Savage, in forming thinking regarding each of the two bets in the form of a roulette lottery, an individual may 
constitute the first-order thinking identically for each of the two bets as “it would offer a prize 100 or -100, 
each with probability 2/1 ." However, as indicated in the correspondence, “it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the man will prefer the former bet, since by betting on a coin toss he might win a hundred dollars under 
circumstances in which it would be worthless, namely, in the event that his wife dies. According to Aumann, 
this example describes a situation in which the notion of a consequence whose "value" is state independent 
does not exist.” (Karni, 1993, p. 187). As suggested by the argument, an individual’s thinking of a bet in the 
form of a roulette lottery would be merely one of the initial, crucial elements in his thinking formation during 
the whole process of decision-making.  
     Based on a consequence, an act is constituted by associating a space of consequence-value-relevant states 
with consequences to represent the higher-order thinking which may be developed by an individual with 
state-dependent preferences. Symbolically, with )(X
 
denoting the set of all consequences, an act is defined as 
a function )(: Xf   which specifies a nonnegative real number )/( txf
 
for every prize Xx  and 
every state t
 
such that   Xx txf 1)/(  for every state t  (Karni, 1993; Seo, 2009). Following 
Anscombe and Aumann, Karni refered to an act whose range is the set of all roulette lotteries by a horse lottery. 
To include the probability model and the state-variable model as special cases in analyzing decision-making 
under uncertainty, Myerson (1991) also defined a lottery as a function )(: Xf   so that the prize may be 
associated with both objective unknowns and subject unknowns, which may be described respectively by such a 
probability measure on the measurable space ),( XX   and by such a state variable t , as specified above 
for an act. For any two acts )/( txf  and )/( txg , Seo (2009) referred to )1(  f  as a component-wise 
mixture, with the second-stage mixture operation defined as ))(()1())(())()()1((  tgtftgf   
for every t  and XB , where XB  represents the Borel  algebra on X , and indicated that a 
one-stage lottery in )(X
 
may be induced by each )/( txf  and )()( t , where )(
 
is the set of all 
probability measures on the set of states  , through the mixture operation represented as 
)()(...)()()()(),( 2211  tfttfttftf  . This mixture operation facilitates inter-thinking 
representations of an individual’s thinking of an act and his thinking of the corresponding consequence, given 
his prior belief regarding the measurement of the probabilities of the states, represented by )()( t .  
 
3. DOMINANT-STATE THINKING CHARACTERIZATION 
 
In the example described by Aumann (Karni, 1993), a man adores his wife and his life would be less 
attractive without her. So far as his wife is concerned, the man is confronted with two distinct states, one of his 
wife being surviving and the other of his wife being no longer surviving. For this man, the state of his wife being 
surviving would be dominant over the state of his wife being no longer surviving in that the man prefers the 
former state in an extreme extent to the latter state. In the present study, a state which is dominant over all the 
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other states for an individual would be referred to as a dominant state for this individual and all the others states 
as dominated states. To characterize the state-dependent preferences of an individual, the importance of each of 
the states and the individual’s evaluation of the prizes realized in each state would be crucial elements in his 
formation of state-related thinking and state-dependent choice.  
To conceptualize a dominant state perceived by an individual in his formation of state-related thinking and 
state-dependent choice, choice among pure lotteries will be examined in the study. With the prior information 
possessed by an individual regarding the states, as represented by a probability measure space  ),,( P , 
where },...,1{ N ,   is a  field in  , and P  is a probability measure on  , a lottery )/( txf
 
would be referred to as a pure lottery in the study if there exists a Xx ft   for every state t  
such that 
1)/( txf ft . Let the set L  denote the set of all those pure lotteries available to an individual to choose from, 
and the set 
XL  represent the set }1)/(),...,{( 1  txfLfxx
f
t
f
N
f
, which contains the state-labeled prize 
combinations of all the pure lotteries in the set L . With the prior information possessed by an individual 
regarding the states, as represented by a probability measure space ),,( P , the individual’s thinking of the 
prior choice space may be represented symbolically as an expended choice space comprising the set of the pure 
lotteries available to the individual and the probability measure space perceived by him in the symbolic form of 
)},,(,{ PL  , which may be alternatively represented symbolically by )},,(,{ PLX  . An 
individual’s choice operations on the expanded choice space may be represented with respect to his choice 
operations on L , the set of pure lotteries, or on XL , the set of state-labeled prize combinations, conditional on 
his prior partial information represented by the  field   contained in ),,( P .  
With the choice space )},,(,{  PL
X
 possessed by an individual, his preference relation   on 
XL
 
is assumed as usual to be a complete and transitive binary relation, indicating by 
),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx 
 
that ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx is weakly preferred to ),...,( 1
g
N
g xx . As 
),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   and ),...,(),...,( 11
f
N
fg
N
g xxxx  , the binary relation between 
),...,( 1
f
N
f xx and ),...,( 1
g
N
g xx  is represented by ),...,(~),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx . As ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx
 
is strictly 
preferred to ),...,( 1
g
N
g xx , the strict binary preference relation between the two state-labeled prize combinations 
would be represented symbolically by ),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx  , which indicates the relation 
“ ),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   and not ),...,(),...,( 11
f
N
fg
N
g xxxx  .” In this framework, the characteristics of a 
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dominant state embedded in the dominant-state thinking of an individual would be identified for the purpose of 
appropriately representing his state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking.  
For an individual who is confronted with the expanded choice space, )},,(,{(  PL
X
, the 
representation of a state s  as a dominant state for an individual may be such that for any two state-labeled 
prize combinations ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx  and ),...,( 1
g
N
g xx
XL , ),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   as gs
f
s xx  . As 
indicated by such representation, the state-labeled prize combination ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx  associated with the pure 
lottery )/( txf
 
would be strictly preferred by an individual to the state-labeled prize combinations 
),...,( 1
g
N
g xx  associated with the pure lottery )/( txg
 
if the prize level associated with )/( txf  in the 
dominant state is higher than the prize level associated with )/( txg  in the dominant state. However, the 
representation of an individual’s dominant-state thinking as such may be subject to the undesirable preference 
properties of the existence of discontinuity in his state-dependent preferences and the necessity of extremely high 
utility levels associated with a dominant state.   
By the expected-utility maximization theorem, an individual’s choice among a set of pure lotteries L
 
would be equivalent to his choice among the state-labeled prize combinations associated with the pure lotteries 
with respect to the expected utility levels derived from the state-labeled prize combinations. With the 
individual’s state-dependent utility function represented symbolically as ),( txu , the expected utility derived 
from ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx  would be  
 

t Xx
txftxutP )/(),()/( , which would be equal to 


t
f
t txutP ),()/(  for the 
pure lottery )/( txf , while the expected utility derived from ),...,( 1
g
N
g xx  would be  
 

t Xx
txgtxutP )/(),()/( , 
which would be equal to 


t
g
t txutP ),()/(  for the pure lottery )/( txg . In the study, it is assumed as usual 
that 0),0( tu
 
for every t .   
If the representation of a dominant state s  is such that for any two pure lotteries )/( txf
 
and 
)/( txg , ),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   as gs
f
s xx  , the representation of a dominant state as such would imply 
that 


t
g
t
t
f
t txutPtxutP ),()/(),()/(  as 
g
s
f
s xx   even though 
f
t
g
t xx   for every Tt  
, where 
}{sT  . For two pure lotteries )/( txf
 
and )/( txg , suppose that kxx gs
f
s  , 
0k , and for every 
Tt , ft
g
t xx  . As k  
approaches zero, 
f
sx  would approaches
g
sx , and it would turn out to hold that 
]),(),()[/()],(),()[/( 


Tt
f
t
g
t
g
s
f
s txutxutPsxusxusP  , which would suggest the reversal of the 
preference ordering of )/( txf
 
and )/( txg  as indicated by 


t
g
t
t
f
t txutPtxutP ),()/(),()/( . The 
pure lottery )/( txg  would turn out to be strictly referred to )/( txf . Then it would be 
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)),/(),/(( txftxg instead of ))/(),/(( txgtxf , which would belong to the graph of the binary state-dependent 
preference relation 
 
in the set of pure lotteries, L , as h
 
approaches zero. This implies the existence of 
inconsistency in an individual’s dominant-state preferences as a result of the existence of discontinuity in his 
state-dependent preferences.  
Similarly, for two pure lotteries )/( txf
 
and )/( txg , suppose that kxx gs
f
s  , 
0k , and for every 
Tt  ft
g
t xx  . If the representation of a dominant state s  is such that for any two pure lotteries )/( txf  
and )/( txg , ),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   as gs
f
s xx  , with 
g
s
f
s xx  , it should hold under such 
representation of a dominant-state that ]),(),()[/()],(),()[/( 


Tt
f
t
g
t
g
s
f
s txutxutPsxusxusP , which 
may be further expressed as ]),(),()][/(/)/([)],(),([ 


Tt
f
t
g
t
g
s
f
s txutxusPtPsxusxu . For the case that 
0gsx , ]),(),()][/(/)/([),( 


Tt
f
t
g
t
f
s txutxusPtPsxu . Since for such representation of a dominant state 
to hold, the relation should be true for any positive value which )/(/)/(  sPtP  or ),(),( txutxu ft
g
t  , 
Tt , may take, the utility level ),( sxu ft , derived in the culmination of the dominant state , may need to be 
extremely high, in particular as the probability )/( sP , associated with the dominant state, is extremely small. 
Moreover, as indicated by the relation that ]),(),()][/(/)/([)],(),([ 


Tt
f
t
g
t
g
s
f
s txutxusPtPsxusxu , for 
0gsx , the increase of ),(),( sxusxu
g
s
f
s   in the state-dependent utility level associated with the dominant 
state would need to be extremely high as there is an increase in sx  from 
f
sx  to 
g
sx .   
 
4. DOMINATED STATES AND DOMINANT-STATE THINKING 
 
As tentatively represented previously, a state s  may be referred to as a dominant state for an 
individual, if for any two state-labeled prize combinations ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx  and ),...,( 1
g
N
g xx
XL , 
),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   as gs
f
s xx  . However, such representation of a dominant state would give rise not 
only to inconsistency in an individual’s state-dependent preferences as a result of the existence of discontinuity 
in his state-dependent preferences, but also to the necessity of extremely high utility levels associated with the 
dominant state. It appears that the difficulties arise as a result of the representation of a dominant state with a 
focus on the dominant state rather than on the dominated states. In the example presented by Aumann, “Aumann 
describes a man who loves his wife very much, and whose life without her would be less attractive, less ‘worth 
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living.’ The wife is sick and must undergo a routine but dangerous operation that only half of all patients 
survive.” (Karni, 1993, p. 187)  To the man in the example, the state of his wife being no longer surviving is 
dominated by the state of his wife being surviving, and an extremely low utility level would be associated with 
his utility derived in the state of his wife being no longer surviving.  
As suggested by the example presented by Aumann, a dominated state Tt  may be represented as a null 
state in the strict sense that for any state-labeled prize combination ),...,( 1
h
N
h xx  
XL , 0),( txu ht . With the 
representation of a dominated state as a null state, a state s  may be referred to as a dominant state for an 
individual, if for any state-labeled prize combination 
Xh
N
h Lxx ),...,( 1 , 0),( txu
h
t  for every Tt , where 
}{sT  , and 0),( sxu
h
s  as 0
h
sx . Under such representation of a dominant state with dominated 
states represented as null states in the strict sense, for any two state-labeled prize combinations ),...,( 1
f
N
f xx  and 
),...,( 1
g
N
g xx
XL , it would follow as a result that ),...,(),...,( 11
g
N
gf
N
f xxxx   as gs
f
s xx  . For a dominant 
state s  and any two pure lotteries )/( txf
 
and )/( txg  with kxx gs
f
s  , 0k , and 
f
t
g
t xx   for 
every Tt , 0]),(),()[/( 
Tt
f
t
g
t txutxutP  under the representation of a dominated state as a null state. As 
k
 
approaches zero and the state-labeled prize 
f
sx  approaches
g
sx , 
0]),(),()[/()],(),()[/(  
Tt
f
t
g
t
g
s
f
s txutxutPsxusxusP , and the expected utility levels associated with 
the two pure lotteries would be equal; that is, 


t
g
t
t
f
t txutPtxutP ),()/(),()/( . By including the 
characterization of a dominated state as a null state in the representation of a dominant state, an individual's 
state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking may be more appropriately represented without the 
undesirable property of the existence of discontinuity in the individual's state-dependent preferences. Moreover, 
for the case that 0k  and 0gsx , it would hold for any positive value which ),( sxu
f
s may take that 
]),(),()][/(/)/([),( 


Tt
f
t
g
t
f
s txutxusPtPsxu . Furthermore, with 0
g
sx , for it to hold that 
]),(),()][/(/)/([)],(),([ 


Tt
f
t
g
t
g
s
f
s txutxusPtPsxusxu , the increase of ),(),( sxusxu
g
s
f
s   in the 
state-dependent utility level associated with the dominant state as a result of an increase in the 
dominant-state-labeled prize from  
f
sx  to 
g
sx  may take any positive value. Thus, the necessity of extremely 
high utility levels associated with the dominant state would be avoided by including the characterization of a 
dominated state as a null state in the representation of a dominant state. 
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5. DOMINANT-EVENT THINKING 
 
While an individual may possess state-dependent preferences with a perceived dominant state included in 
the whole set of states and all the other dominated states perceived as null states, an individual may need to make 
choice with the information that a certain event R  has occurred. For the example presented by Aumann, 
the prior state space confronting the man may be represented by a product state space 21  , where 
1  includes the state 1  of his wife being surviving and the other state 2  of his wife being no longer 
surviving. With a product state space 21  , an individual’s dominant-state thinking may be represented 
more generally in the form of dominant-event thinking. Let the product state space be represented by 
21  , where },...,1{1 M  and },...,1{2 N . A lottery )/( txf  
may be referred to as pure 
lottery if there exists a Xx ft   for every state 21 t  
such that 1)/( txf ft . Let the set 
XL  represent 
the set }1)/(),...,{( 11  txfLfxx
f
t
f
MN
f
, which is the set of the state-labeled prize combinations of all the 
pure lotteries in the set L . Let the event 2}{ s  for 1s  
be represented by 
s , and the set 
21 }}{{  s  by s  
. The event 
2}{ s  
may be referred to as a dominant event for an individual, if for 
any state-labeled prize combination ),...,( 11
h
MN
h xx  
XL , 0),( txu ht  for every st  , and for every 
sd  , 0),( dxu
h
d  as 0
h
dx . For every }{1 sv s  , an event ssv   2}{  would be referred 
to as a dominated event. With the representation of every state contained in a dominated event as a null state, 
0),()/( 
 st
f
t txutP  
for a pure lottery )/( txf
 
with 0ftx , 21 t , 
and it holds that 



ss t
f
t
t
f
t txutPtxutP ),()/(),()/( . 
If every state contained in a dominated event is represented as a null state, the undesirable property of the 
existence of discontinuity in an individual's state-dependent preferences would be also avoided in the presence of 
a dominant event. By similar arguments as presented previously, for any two pure lotteries )/( txf
 
and 
)/( txg , suppose that 0gdx   and kxx
g
d
f
d  , 0k , for every sd  , and 
f
t
g
t xx   for every st  . 
With the event 
2}{ s  represented as a dominant event and every state contained in a dominated event as a 
null state, it would hold that 


t
g
t
t
f
t txutPtxutP ),()/(),()/( , even as 
f
t
g
t xx   for every st  . 
Moreover, as k
 
approaches zero, 
f
dx  would approaches 
g
dx  uniformly for every sd  , and 



t
g
t
t
f
t txutPtxutP ),()/(),()/( . Furthermore, as 0
g
dx  for every sd  , 
kxx gc
f
c  , 0k , for 
sc  , 
g
e
f
e xx   
for every }{ce s  , and 
f
t
g
t xx   for every st  , it would hold that 
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]),(),()][/(/)/([),( 


st
f
t
g
t
f
c txutxucPtPcxu , for any positive value which ),( cxu
f
c  may take. In the 
presence of a dominant event, the representation of the states contained in the dominated events as null states 
would exclude the existence of discontinuity in an individual's state-dependent preferences and the necessity of 
extremely high utility levels associated with a state contained in the dominant event.  
While a dominant event contains merely a single element would turn out to be a dominant state and there 
may exist issues associated with both dominant-state thinking and dominant-event thinking, which may be dealt 
with in a consistent way, the representation of a dominant event would be associated with a product state space 
and would enable dominant-state thinking to be represented in a more general context. Moreover, so far as a 
dominant state or a dominant event is concerned, if an individual learns that a certain event R , containing 
the domain state or dominant event perceived by the individual, has occurred, the conditional probability 
)/( tP  in the previous analysis may be replaced by )/( RtP , and the preference relations  ~ ,  , and   
by the preference relations ~ s , s , and s , respectively.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As mentioned by Myerson (1991) with regard to the establishment of the expected-utility maximization 
theorem, the axiom of continuity, based on the axiom of monotonicity, asserts that a lottery ranked by an 
individual between a better lottery and a worse lottery under the culmination of a certain event would be as good 
as some randomization between these two lotteries under the individual’s state-dependent preferences with 
respect to this event. With a dominant state or a dominant event existing in the partial information possessed by 
an individual, the axiom of continuity may not hold in the presence of discontinuity in the individual's 
state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking. While the representation of the dominated states and 
the states contained in the dominated events as null states may tackle not merely the problem of discontinuity in 
an individual's state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking, but also the necessity of extremely 
high utility levels associated with a dominant state or a state contained in the dominant event, questions may be 
raised with regard to the posterior state-dependent preferences of an individual and his further choice in the 
culmination of a dominated event, given his choice made under his prior state-dependent preferences with 
dominant-state thinking. This suggests that there still exist a vast number of issues related to state-dependent 
preferences with dominant-state thinking, which need to be addressed to present more appropriate 
representations of state-dependent preferences with dominant-state thinking within various contexts.  
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